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Cleveland: Miscellaneous

MISCELLANEOUS
I.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

A majority of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances
and Discipline found attorney Stanley B. Crosby guilty of
unethical conduct consisting of two separate acts of business
solicitation in violation of Canon 28 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, Supreme Court Rule 33. The board recommended to the South Carolina Supreme Court that Crosby be
indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in South
Carolina.
In In re Crosby' the court refused to follow the board's
recommendation, holding a public reprimand and formal
warning against further similar professional misconduct to
be the appropriate sanction. While concurring in the court's
determination of Crosby's guilt, two members of the court
dissented, expressing agreement with the board's proposal.
The attorney in In re Donelan2 had been formally
charged with the misappropriation of trust funds. At his
hearing Donelan responded to the charges first by exhibiting
evidence of his having given a secured note for the major
portion of the missing funds and second by simply admitting
mismanagement of the trust funds. The hearing panel ascertained Donelan "had been guilty of misconduct tending to
pollute the administration of justice in the misappropriation
of funds entrusted to him by his client." 3 The panel recognized extenuating circumstances which impelled it to recommend indefinite suspension rather than disbarment. The full
board reviewed the findings and adopted the facts as discovered but divided on the appropriate sanction. The majority
believed disbarment proper while the minority concurred with
the panel's recommendation.
The only matter remaining to be considered by the supreme court was designation of the penalty. After remarking
that the attorney's misconduct had not been repetitious, that
the injured parties had been fully compensated and that the
1. 256 S.C. 325, 182 S.E.2d 289 (1971).
2. 257 S.C. 405, 185 S.E2d 893 (1972).
3. Id. at 406, 185 S.E2d at 893.
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extenuating circumstances deserved some weight, the court
suspended the respondent indefinitely.
In In re Dawsey4 an attorney had been accused of having
twice misappropriated money held in relation to the closing
of real estate transactions. The hearing panel and the board
unanimously agreed to recommend indefinite suspension of
M. Ellis Dawsey. Prior to the supreme court's review of the
case, the respondent had reimbursed the proper parties. Noting Dawsey's refusal to contest the findings of the board and
his acceptance of the indefinite suspension recommendation,
the court forthrightly concurred in the board's determination
and directed that Dawsey be indefinitely suspended from
South Carolina law practice.
In re Hartzog5 concerned the final disposition of two complaints against attorney B. Gerald Hartzog. The first alleged
he had solicited employment in the settlement of a tort claim
and the second charged him with having passed two worthless
checks in Florida. The hearing panel concluded that Hartzog
had breached the ethics of the profession by committing the
following acts:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

improperly soliciting and obtaining employment as an attorney,
charging a grossly excessive fee,
imposing his own will on his client to settle a claim,
converting his client's funds to his own use, and
frequently issuing worthless checks in his own community and in
the state of Florida, where he held himself out to the public as

an attorney. 6

The board unanimously adopted the panel's recommendation of disbarment. Upon final review, the supreme court,
holding the findings and recommendations of the board sup7
ported by the evidence, directed that Hartzog be disbarred.
A fifth action s resulted from a complaint lodged against
John Howard Wrighten which "specified a number of instances during the period 1964-1969 in which respondent
withheld, failed to account for or misappropriated funds belonging to clients."9 Wrighten denied the charges. After enter4. 257 S.C. 411, 186 S.E.2d 250 (1972).

5. 257

S.C. 84, 184 S.E2d 116 (1971).

6. Id. at 85, 184 S.E.2d at 117.

7. The court noted in passing that Hartzog had failed to appear before the
hearing panel, the board and before it on final review.
8. In re Wrighten, 257 S.C. 184, 184 S.E.2d 717 (1971).
9. Id. at 184, 184 S.E.2d at 718.
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taining all the evidence, the panel concluded Wrighten "had
been guilty of flagrant and repeated misconduct in failing
to remit or account for funds due to his clients."' 10 The panel's
report advised disbarment.
Prior to the full board's consideration, the respondent
submitted his resignation as a member of the Bar. With the
panel's findings standing undisputed, the board recommended
acceptance of the resignation, provided "that the court determine that (the resignation is) legally binding upon him
in terms of his promise not to apply for readmission and
secondly, that the court be informed that the board considered this to be the only alternative to disbarment."" The dissenting members believed disbarment to be the appropriate
sanction. The sole question before the supreme court was
whether to disbar him or accept his resignation. Noting that
the offer to resign came late in the proceedings, the court disbarred Wrighten.
2
.The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Chipley
held that in a proceeding for the suspension of an attorney
from federal practice "[p]rocedural due process . . . does
not require that a hearing be given to the attorney involved,
but he must be given fair notice of the charge against him
and an opportunity to explain and defend his actions."' 13
Chipley argued that the court could not rely on the findings
of the South Carolina Supreme Court in the state disbarment
proceedings, thereby constraining the district court to conduct
an evidentiary hearing. Responding to this contention, the
court recognized that the state's disbarment action did not
dictate a similar result but that "it [was] entitled to respect,
and reliance on such action is not error,"' 4 in light of the state
court's "full evidentiary hearing,"'15 the record of which adequately illustrated Chipley's infirmity.

10. Id.
11. Id. at 185, 184 S.E2d at 718.
12. 448 F.2d 1234 (4th Cir. 1971). In re Chipley, 254 S.C. 588, 176 S.E.2d
412 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971), is the decision suspending Chipley from South Carolina law practice for reasons of mental illness.
13. 448 F.2d at 1235. See In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1967).
14. 448 F.2d at 1235. See Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 282 (1957)

(dictum).
15. 448 F.2d at 1235.
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II. SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC WELFARE
Holden v. Richardson'8 involved a claimant's suit against
the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare requesting
judicial review of a hearing examiner's denial of a disability
claim under the Social Security Act. Plaintiff's benefits under
the Act had expired March 31, 1957, and when she applied on
February 7, 1966, the request was denied by citing the 1957
expiration date as the date she last qualified for compensation. After the denial was reconsidered in accordance with
her request, the decision was affirmed on June 16, 1966, and
she sought no further review.
On August 19, 1969, the plaintiff reapplied, but another
denial issued which was affirmed on February 5, 1970, after
reconsideration. Plaintiff then employed counsel. On February 16, 1970, a hearing was requested but subsequently denied
on grounds of res judicata. At plaintiff's request the appeals
council reviewed the dismissal but found it accurate and
stated the "determination dated June 16,171966, stands as the
final determination of this Department."'
Upon review by the United States District Court for the
District of South Carolina, the court found no material change
in the facts in the second application. Citing Leviner v. Richardson18 as dispositive of the issue in the fourth circuit, the
court in dismissing the action held that when a claimant bypasses the opportunity to have a hearing, the doctrine of res
judicata applies to any subsequent application when the benefits requested and the grounds for such benefits are the same
as in the first application.
In Peoples v. Richardson' the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals reached a similar conclusion. Roy H. Peoples sued
the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to secure
benefits under the Social Security Act. After a hearing, his
first application was denied by the examiner and by the appeals council on review. A subsequent claim was refused also,
and he failed to request a hearing. Peoples finally sought judicial review on this third rejected application. The United
16.
17.
18.
19.

331 F. Supp. 364 (D.S.C. 1971).
Id. at 365.
443 F.2d 1338 (4th Cir. 1971).
455 F.2d 924 (4th Cir. 1972).
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States District Court for the District of South Carolina remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing, holding res judicata to be no defense when the claimant had not been afforded
a hearing on his second application. On the defendant's appeal,
reversing the district court decision, the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals held res judicata in proceedings under the Social
Security Act to be a valid defense to a claim based on the
same facts, rights and issues as prior claims, when judicial
review has not been sought after the final administrative
determination.
Harris v. Richardson20 involved an appeal by the defendant Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare requesting reversal of a decision by the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina awarding benefits to plaintiff Arelevia R. Harris, whose administrative claim had been
denied. The case turned on the lower court's handling of the
"substantial evidence test" 21 applicable to such administrative
decisions. The test requires affirmance of the Secretary's
judgment if it is supported by substantial evidence in the
record.
The court of appeals found error in the lower court's
reliance on case authority 22 which had been subsequently overturned by a 1967 amendment2 3 to the Social Security Act.
The new ruling meant that, even though competent medical
evidence established the disability of a claimant, he was not
disabled within the meaning2 4 of the Act if he was still capable
of maintaining gainful employment. The court further held
that the district court had erred in attaching little weight to
the vocational ex pert's testimony. Again, case law25 had been
modified by an amendment,2 6 rendering the vocational expert's testimony a decisive factor in a claim under the Act.
The lower court's failure to regard the medical advisor's opinion as substantial evidence also constituted error. The district
21
court's decision was rendered in reliance on authority
20. 450 F.2d 1099 (4th Cir. 1971).

21. See Thomas v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541, 543 (4th Cir. 1964).
22. See Leftwich v. Gardner, 377 F2d 287 (4th Cir. 1967).

23. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(4) (1970).
24. See U.S. CODE CONG. &AD.NEws 2883 (1967).
25. Gardner v. Earnest, 371 F.2d 606 (4th Cir. 1967).

26. 42 U.S.C. §423(d) (2) (A) (1970).
27. Cohen v. Perales, 412 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'd sub norm. Richard-

son v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
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which had been later reversed by Richardson v. Perales, 28 a
United States Supreme Court decision commenting approvingly on the use of medical advisors.
The plaintiff in Collins v. Richardson29 brought his action to contest the final administrative denial of his application for benefits under the Act. After reviewing the medical
history of the plaintiff and the administrative handling of
the claim, the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina declared:
The record in this case is incomplete in three respects: the selection
of an unqualified medical advisor; failure to receive and consider a
report of the Oteen hospitalization of 1969, alluded to by the plaintiff
at the hearing; and failure to submit vocational information to an
accredited vocational expert.3 0

A psychiatrist had served as the medical advisor during
the hearing examiner's review. At a hearing on a social security claim, an advisor, acting as a neutral party,31 interprets
other physicians' reports and the medical evidence to give the
examiner an understanding of the problems involved. In this
instance, the advisor had been called on to analyze the reports
of internists and neurologists. The court found the use of a
psychiatrist for this purpose an impropriety and commented
that "the pedagogic role to be played by a medical advisor can
be best performed by one who is more closely involved in that
3
specialty." -1
The court also took issue with the hearing examiner's
reliance on the medical advisor's testimony on the availability
of employment suitable for the claimant. After indicating that
inquiries into actual job availability were no longer required
since the recent amendments, the court, in light of the particular physical handicaps of the plaintiff, was "not convinced
that proper testimony was adduced with regard to whether
such work exists anywhere. ' 33 The court then held that the
hearing examiner had erred in failing to secure an opinion
of a qualified vocational expert who could fairly determine
28. 402 U.S. 389 (1971).

29. 334 F. Supp. 1333 (D.S.C. 1971).
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 1335.
See 402 U.S. at 408.
334 F. Supp. at 1336.
Id. at 1337.
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whether the jobs suggested by the psychiatrist could in fact
exist.
In Edgens v. Richardson34 attorney James B. Stephen
sought reversal of a district court decision disallowing his
request for legal fees amounting to twenty-five per cent of
an award of $15,584.20 given his client under the Social Security Act. Twenty-five per cent of a social security award
is the maximum permitted under statutory law.35 In affirming
the district court's allowance of $2,500.00 as reasonable legal
fees, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court's discretionary authority to make fee adjustments
had not been abused.
III.

ARMED SERVICES

Frank J. Lupo, a soldier in basic training at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, alleged that a severed achilles tendon
disabled him for duty. In a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus he sought discharge from the United States Army. In
Lupo v. Laird 6 the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina considered the plaintiff's claim. The
evidence before the court indicated that the report of Lupo's
private podiatrist had been evaluated and consistently respected by the army. Lupo had been examined twice after
induction, and the last report noted that the duty restrictions
previously assigned were in fact generous. The court recognized that a substantial factual basis must exist to warrant
judicial interference in military affairs. Language from Mr.
Justice Jackson's opinion for the United States Supreme
Court in Orloff v. Willoughby37 was cited for the general
proposition that the judiciary has only limited authority over
the military. In matters of discrimination, capriciousness or
violation of due process, the courts are fully able to grant
redress to servicemen. Relying chiefly on an opinion 8 s of the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the court refused to disturb
the army's authority over the matter.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

455 F2d 508 (4th Cir. 1972).
42 U.S.C. §406(b)(1) (1970).
329 F. Supp. 732 (D.S.C. 1971).
345 U.S. 83 (1953).
Byrne v. Resor, 412 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1969).
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Ehlert v. United States"9 was held to be controlling in
United States v. McKee. 40 William E. McKee, after receiving
his induction notice, applied for a conscientious objector's
classification. His draft board refused to consider it, and he
ignored his induction orders. After conviction for failure to
report, McKee argued on appeal that his application for a
new status should have been evaluated. The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals held, in accordance with Ehlert, "that a
registrant whose conscientious objection crystallizes only
after his induction notice is mailed has no right to have his
classification reopened, and that he. must submit his claim
through military channels." 41
IV.

LABOR RELATIONS

In Isaacson v. Penn Community Services, Inc.,42 the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals examined the narrow issue
of whether a conscientious objector performing civilian work
of national importance in lieu of military obligation is entitled
to minimum and overtime wages as outlined in the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938. 4 3 The plaintiff had prevailed in the
United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, and the defendant appealed.
Plaintiff Brian Isaacson became acquainted with Penn
Community Services, Inc., through its circulars advertising
the availability of positions which would qualify as substitute
service of national importance for conscientious objectors.
The jobs had been created exclusively for qualified unmarried
conscientious objectors. The draft board approved the plaintiff's work application, and he remained employed for thirty
days beyond the twenty-four month mandatory period.
The circular particularized the work involved. Concerning remuneration the circular stated:
A subsistence salary of $100.00 a month is offered, room and utilities
provided, together with hospitalization insurance and a three-week
vacation annually. Traveling to and from Penn at the beginning and
end of the period will be provided. Board is provided during conferences.

39.
40.
41.
42.

44

402 U.S. 99 (1971).
446 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1971).
Id.
450 F.2d 1306 (4th Cir. 1971).

43. 29 U.S.C. §§201-219 (1970).

44. 450 F.2d at 1307.
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Isaacson's initial monthly salary was $108.34; however,
in less than a year, his monthly salary increased first to
$150.00, then to $183.00. For the thirty days beyond the
twenty-four month period, he earned $2.00 per hour. Besides
claiming the difference between his actual salary and the
standard minimum wages, he requested overtime pay as computed under the Act.
The critical issue involved the interpretation of the word
"'employee" 45 as used in the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Walling v. PortlandTerminal Co. 6 shed light on the problem.
In Walling the United States Supreme Court held that railroad brakeman trainees learning the skill under supervision
were not employees as defined in the Act because "the railroads receive no 'immediate advantage' from any work done
by the trainees.

' 47

Conceding that the plaintiff had not been

a trainee for two years, the court reasoned that the circumstances under which he had served created a relationship
chiefly beneficial to him and held that he was not an "employee" under the Act.
An opinion 45 by the Wage-Hour Administrator posed an
obstacle to the court's reasoning. Even though one interpretation of the opinion clearly contradicts its rationale, the
court, considering the goals of the Selective Service Act,
chose to rely on its construction of Walling for authority.
The last sentence of the opinion synopsizes the conclusion of
the court:
But here, where a special position was
with a means of performing work of
plaintiff did not displace another member
and where plaintiff voluntarily entered
importance in fulfillment of his obligation

45. 29 U.S.C. §§203(d), (e),
ployee," and "employ" as follows:
(d) "Employer" includes
rectly in the interest of an
(e) "Employee" includes
ployer ....

and (g)

created to provide plaintiff
national importance, where
of the general labor market,
upon his work of national
to serve with full knowledge

(1970)

define "employer," "em-

any person acting directly or indiemployer ....
any individual employed by an em-

(g) "Employ" includes to suffer or permit to work.
46. 330 U.S. 148 (1947).
47. Id. at 153.
48. Id., 450 F.2d 1310-11.
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of the limited subsistence to be provided him, we cannot conclude that
49
he has a right to judgment under the Act.

Haworth v. White Stack Towing Co.2 0 was an action to
recover wages lost as a result of an alleged wrongful discharge from employment. On appeal to the South Carolina
Supreme Court, the defendant contended as a complete defense that pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement
between the plaintiff's labor union and the defendant "the
factual issues with respect to plaintiff's discharge were submitted to a final and binding arbitration which resulted in a
finding that his discharge was for just cause." 51
The only issue before the court was whether the arbitrator's decision constituted a defense to the action. The
evidence before the court corresponded to that before the
arbitrator. Overturning the lower court's decision, the supreme court held that the binding character of the arbitration
under the circumstances precluded "the relitigation of that
issue in this action."152
53
The plaintiff in Tolbert v. Daniel Construction Co.

pressed a multi-faceted claim in his amended complaint. Originally, the plaintiff alleged that since the defendant had refused to employ him his rights under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 196454 had been violated. The amended complaint averred in addition to the Title VII claim an action
under section 1981", of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Tolbert
also asserted that the suit was brought as a class action and
that the defendant employed him at a later date but released
him because of his race. Counsel representing the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission participated in the case
as amicus curiae. Arguments were heard before the United
States District Court for the District of South Carolina.
The evidence revealed that by letter dated January 17,
1967, Tolbert notified the Commission of the alleged hiring
discrimination which occurred in December, 1966. The Com49. Id. at 1311.
50. 256 S.C. 542, 183 S.E.2d 320 (1971).
51. Id. at 543, 183 S.E.2d at 320.
52. Id. at 545, 183 S.E2d at 321.
53. 332 F. Supp. 772 (D.S.C. 1971).
54. 42 U.S.C. §§1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h-6 (1970).
55. 42 U.S.C. §1981 (1970).
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mission, being unable to persuade the defendant to voluntarily
comply, answered Tolbert by letter dated November 16, 1967,
informing him of his right to sue within thirty days. At plaintiff's request counsel was appointed on December 11, 1967;
however, the suit was not filed until March 22, 1971.
The Title VII claim was first considered. The Commission argued that the thirty-day statute of limitations"6 had
been tolled by Tolbert's request for counsel within that period.
The court opined that the decisions 5 7 relied upon for support
of that argument could not be extended and held the long
delay in filing suit to be a bar to the Title VII claim.
The recovery theory under section 1981 of the 1866 Act
was next discussed. Despite authority 58 allowing unreserved
access to a section 1981 claim, the court, following the reasoning of a Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision, 59 held
that the Act "creates for the plaintiff a separate and independent cause of action, which is, without doubt, available
to him since he has established a 'reasonable excuse' for his
failure to comply with the jurisdictional prerequisites under
L °
Title VII."
The viability of the class action allegation depended on
its merits under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-

dure. The evidence revealed that the plaintiff's last association with the defendant occurred approximately three years
earlier, at which time he had been employed for only one

week. The evidence further demonstrated that Tolbert had
worked only in the brick mason crews. Dismissing the Rule
23 allegation, the court held that Tolbert failed to "fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class." 61
Finally, plaintiff argued that the defendant had later
hired him and discharged him for racial reasons. Refusing
to strike this allegation, the court held that the defendant's
56. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(e) (1970).

57. Prescod v. Ludwig Indus., 325 F. Supp. 414 (N.D.Ill. 1971); Reyes v.
Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 53 F.R.D. 293 (D.Kan. 1971); McQueen v.
E.M.C. Plastic Co., 302 F. Supp. 881 (E.D.Tex. 1969).

58. Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971);
Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1970).
59. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970).
60. 332 F. Supp. at 774.
61. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
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argument that the charge transcended the scope of the Commission's alleged discrimination was inapplicable, since the
claim now proceeded solely under the 1866 Act.
V.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

Dew v. Hardij62 was an action commenced in United
States District Court, District of South Carolina, seeking
review of a decision by the Secretary of Agriculture denying
plaintiff's request for additional tobacco inspectors for his
auction warehouse. The gravamen of plaintiff's argument
was that the Secretary had based his decision "upon his
knowledge of conditions or actions affecting the industry
as a whole, conditions and actions not reflected in the record
of the hearing."0 3 The defendant denied the allegation but
contended that consideration of factors outside the record
would be permissible.
Relying on statutory directives 64 and case law65 as authority, the court concluded that the Secretary's prerogatives
were broad and discretionary. Finding that compliance with
departmental administrative regulations6 6 had been accomplished, the court held that factors and conditions outside
the record may properly be considered by the Secretary in
ruling on an application for additional tobacco inspectors.
Plaintiffs in Pitts v. CampI67 sued in the United States
District Court for the District of South Carolina requesting
reversal of the final judgment of the Comptroller of the Currency denying their application for the formation of a new
national bank in Hartsville, South Carolina. The evidence
revealed that a field investigation had been initially conducted by the defendant and that following the first denial,
at plaintiffs' request, an additional field analysis was accomplished, after which the final denial was rendered. The plain-

62. 329 F. Supp. 593 (D.S.C. 1971).
63. Id. at 595.

64. 7 U.S.C. §511d (1970).
65. Danville Tobacco Ass'n v. Freeman, 275 F. Supp. 350, 352 (W.D.Va.

1952).
66. 7 C.F.R. §§29.2(a) (2), 29.3(i) (1971).
67. 329 F. Supp. 1302 (D.S.C. 1971).
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tiffs' first contention 8 that the omission of a hearing constituted error was readily dismissed by the court on the grounds
that the plantiffs' failure to timely request a hearing in the
administrative stages deprived them of their right to complain of its absence on judicial review. 69
Plaintiffs argued additionally that since they had satisfied the statutory requirements 70 the Comptroller should have
granted the charter. The Comptroller responded to that argument by alleging that his authority to grant charters was
discretionary to the extent that he could consider a community's need for a bank in his decision.7 1 The court observed
that the statutory scheme did not authorize the Comptroller
to weigh the factor of a community's need for a bank in deciding whether to grant the charter. Nevertheless, the court
favored the defendant's position. The court found persuasive
the defendant's "long and continued practice"7 2 of considering the community's need for a bank because the procedure
was based on the sound policy of protection of the community
through minimization of bank failures and was supported by
the weight of authority.7 3 Following this reasoning, the court
decided that it should not interfere with the decision denying
the charter because the Comptroller had not erred in weighing
the factor of the community's need for a bank in his decision.
VI.

SURETY

United States v. Algernon Blair, Inc.74 was an action in
the United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina brought by a building materials supplier to recover
under a subcontractor's payment bond. The suit grew out of
a network of contractual agreements among companies in68. It relied on First Natil Bank v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1965)
and Bank of Haw River v. Saxon, 257 F. Supp. 74 (M.D.N.C. 1966). Both
cases offered little weight to this facet of plaintiffs' argument because in each
case hearings had been timely requested and granted. Regulations relevant to

hearings cited by the court are found at 12 C.F.R. §§412(d), (e) (1971).
69. See First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Camp, 409 F2d 1086 (4th Cir.

1969).
70. 12 U.S.C. §§21-27 (1970).
71. The Comptroller's final denial letter evidenced reliance on the community's need for a bank. 329 F. Supp. at 1306.
72. 329 F. Supp. at 1307.

73. Sterling Nat'l Bank v. Camp. 431 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1970).
74. 329 F. Supp. 1360 (D.S.C. 1971).
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volved directly or indirectly in the construction of military
barracks. The general contractor, J. W. Bateson, Inc., contracted with the United States for the project. Bateson
subcontracted with Phillips Air Devices, Inc., for the work
involving the lockers and shelves. Bateson as general contractor was obliged to comply with Miller Act specifications75
requiring payment and performance bonds. In controversy
here was a separate bond which Bateson required the subcontractor Phillips to furnish. In this action plaintiff Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corporation, which had supplied materials to Phillips, sought to recover the cost of the materials
from Aetna Insurance Company, surety on the subcontractor's
bond.
The controversy centered around the interpretation of
a portion of the subcontractor's bond which provided:
NOW, THEREFORE, the condition of this obligation is such ...
that if the Subcontractor shall make payment to all claimants for all
costs and expenses resulting from the performance of this Subcontract
and for all labor and material used or reasonably required for use in
the performance of the Subcontract for all or any part of which the
General Contractor or Owner is liable, failing which such claimants
shall have a direct right of action against the Subcontractor and
Surety under this obligation, subject to the General Contractor's priority, and/or the General Contractor shall have the right to bring an
action against the Subcontractor and Surety on behalf of unpaid
claimants, then this obligation shall be null and void; otherwise, it
shall remain in full force and effect ....

(emphasis added)70

Aetna alleged that the bond's clause "for all or any part
of which the General Contractor or Owner is liable" meant
the surety's liability went no further than the general contractor's liability, which was circumscribed by the Miller
Act.77 Labor and material suppliers who wish to claim against
the surety of the general contractor's bond must commence
their actions within one year,78 and if no express or implied
contract exists with the general contractor, as in the instant
case, they must also give ninety-day notice7 9 of their claims.
Wheeling-Pittsburgh had clearly not conformed to these Miller
Act requirements, thus exempting Bateson from responsibility.
75. 40 U.S.C. §270a(a)(1), (2) (1970).
76. 329 F. Supp. at 1361.

77. 40 U.S.C. §§270a-d (1970).
78. 40 U.S.C. §270b(b) (1970).
79. 40 U.S.C. §270b(a) (1970).
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The plaintiff argued that the disputed clause served only
to identify the class of items covered by the bond. Under this
interpretation the clause simply restricted Aetna's liability
to items for which the subcontractor would have been liable
under the Miller Act. The plaintiff re-enforced this position
by further asserting that had the parties to the subcontract
bond intended to allow compensation only to those who perfected Miller Act claims, as Aetna contended, they would have
specified such limitations in the section of the subcontract
bond dealing with claim-filing deadlines. That section of the
bond prescribed that claims be submitted "four years from
the day on which the final payment under the contract falls
due."8 0
The court found itself in substantial agreement with the
plaintiff, primarily because the parties to the bond had failed
to design a document unambiguously expressing their intentions. The court resolved the problem of interpreting the bond
by ruling that the ambiguities reflected by the contract of a
compensated surety are to be strongly construed against the
surety. The court found the document to be ambiguous notwithstanding the explanation offered in an affidavit by the
Bateson officer who prepared the disputed bond form. The
parties were bound to vest the document itself with clear language indicating their purposes. While the court admitted
that the plaintiff's interpretation was somewhat tenuous, it
found that if the parties had intended claims against the payment bond to be conditioned on observance of the Miller Act
they should have clearly worded the contract to reflect that
meaning. In conclusion, the court held that the plaintiff was
not required under the ambiguous language of the bond to
perfect its claim under the Miller Act as a condition precedent
to coverage under the surety agreement.
VII.

CORPORATIONS

Swinney v. Keebler8 l held that the controlling shareholders owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation for the benefit
of the holders of the corporation's subordinated debentures
to exercise due care in order to prevent "the acquisition of
the stock and control by any who would loot the corporate
80. 329 F. Supp. at 1361.

81. 329 F. Supp. 216 (D.S.C. 1971).
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assets."8 2 The action was instituted in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina by the holders
of subordinated debentures issued by Meadors, Inc., a candy
manufacturer which had through a series of transfers become
an "uncollectible account receivable. 8 s3 Keebler Company first
purchased Meadors from its twenty-eight shareholders, the
majority of whom were also the holders of its convertible
subordinated debentures. In the transfer to Keebler the holders agreed to exchange their convertible subordinated debentures for subordinated debentures. Keebler no doubt extracted
this concession in order to protect its future investment because Meadors was in fact in dire financial need at the time
of the sale to Keebler.
Several years later, Keebler decided to discontinue involvement in the candy manufacturing business and consequently arranged to sell Meadors for $230,000.00 to Atlantic
Services, Inc., a business inexperienced in candy. Atlantic financed the purchase by negotiating a one-day loan for the
entire purchase price from Meadors' bank. No collateral was
demanded because the bank depended on its understanding
with Atlantic that the loan would be repaid from funds withdrawn from the account of the newly acquired Meadors after
the completion of the transaction. Keebler representatives
had not been participants in the negotiations leading to the
"one-day loan" purchase plan. After the closing of the
Keebler-Atlantic transfer, Atlantic withdrew $310,000.00 from
the Meadors account, which left Meadors with a sizable account receivable. After depositing the $310,000.00 in its own
account, Atlantic repaid the loan of $230,000.00 and apparently retained and utilized the remaining $80,000.00 for purposes unrelated to Meadors.
Only four months after acquisition, Atlantic contracted
to sell Meadors for $352,000.00 to Flora Mir Distributing
Company, Inc., an inactive and negligibly capitalized subsidiary of Flora Mir Candy Corporation. The eventual sale
was consummated similarly to the Keebler-Atlantic transaction in that at the end of the paper-shuffling, Meadors'
account was again the purchase money source. The major
and most noteworthy difference between the two transactions
82. Id. at 224.
83. Id. at 217.
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is that in the second Atlantic, as the seller, plotted the financing scheme. Keebler had in fact warned Atlantic that
Meadors' money could not be used as purchase money when
Atlantic had suggested investigating the possibility of doing
so. Nevertheless, the net result of the two transactions was
that Meadors emerged with a $352,000.00 account receivable
from a corporation with no assets.
Shortly after the last transfer the debentures came into
default. The holders sought relief against Keebler, which
cross-claimed on an indemnity agreement against Atlantic,
which in turn claimed against Flora Mir Candy and Flora
Mir Distributing on a similar indemnity agreement. Both
indemnity agreements included guarantees of the debentures,
rendering the order of liabilities such that Flora Mir Candy
and Flora Mir Distributing were the first liable to Meadors,
upon which lay the primary obligation, and Atlantic and
Keebler were second and third respectively.
Plaintiffs' main theory of recovery against Keebler
rested on an alleged breach of fiduciary duty. The court recognized as a "general rule . . . shares of corporate stock are
property and may be disposed of as the owner sees fit,"84 but
further reasoned that plaintiffs' claim constituted an exception. The plaintiffs argued that InsuransharesCorp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp. 5 imposed the standard of care to which
Keebler had to conform. The following passage from Insuranshares impressed the court:
Without attempting any general definition, and stating the duty in
minimum terms as applicable to the facts of this case, it may be said
that the owners of control are under a duty not to transfer it to outsiders if the circumstances surrounding the proposed transfer are such
as to awaken suspicion and put a prudent man on his guard-unless a
reasonably adequate investigation discloses such facts as would convince a reasonable person that no fraud is intended or likely to result.
Thus, whatever the extent of the primary duty may be, circumstances
may be sufficient to call into being the duty of active vigilance and
inquiry.8 6

Keebler argued that even though its conduct conformed
to the standards of Insuranshares,that case did not properly
84. Id. at 222.
85. 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D.Pa. 1940).
86. 329 F. Supp. at 223, quoting frout 35 F. Supp. at 25.
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state the law. Citing a New York case8 7 which criticized Insurctnshares,Keebler contended that anything short of actual
notice of foul play imposed no liability on it. The defendant
further declared that the policy favoring a free market demanded such a rule.
The court concluded that the standard of care imposed by
Insuranshares was not burdensome. Several circumstances 8
of the sale should have aroused suspicion among Keebler's
officers. The extent of Keebler's investigation of Atlantic was
a requested report from Dun and Bradstreet which gave no
relevant information. The court distinguished the possible
situation in which a seller's inquiries produced deceptive results which might in turn lead to reliance. The court also
conceded that perhaps "the Keebler failure to conduct reasonable investigation of the purchaser was not a sine qua non to
plaintiff's damage,"80) but added that "the sale itself was such
cause."' 00 Considering all the circumstances of the transfer,
the court ruled that Keebler's duty was to exercise due care
in the transfer of the corporation, a breach of which rendered
it liable to the corporation for the benefit of the debenture
91
holders or to the debenture holders directly.
VIII.

BANKRUPTCY

Perry0 2

was an action initiated on an involuntary
In re
petition in bankruptcy filed in the United States District
Court for the District of South Carolina by the alleged cred87. Levy v. American Beverage Corp., 265 App. Div. 208, 38 N.Y.S.2d
517 (1942).
88. The court noted the following: (1) Atlantic's inexperience in the
candy trade; (2) Atlantic's failure to inspect Meadors' operations at the time
the contract of sale was executed; (3) the fact that only one of Atlantic's
accountants examined Meadors in depth; (4) Meadors' lack of an established
market and its unconvincing profits; and (5) Atlantic's failure to contact
Meadors' key personnel to discuss continuation of the business. See 329 F.
Supp. at 220.
89. Id. at 224.
90. Id.
91. The decision included judgments concerning the various liabilities
among the parties arising from the indemnity agreements and guarantees. Essentially, the court found Meadors primarily liable to the debenture holders
and Flora Mir Distributing, Atlantic, and Keebler jointly and severally liable
to Meadors. Flora Mir Candy was found to be the alter ego of Flora Mir Distributing and thus responsible for the accounts owed Meadors by its subsidiary.
92. 336 F. Supp. 420 (D.S.C. 1972).
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itors of Ed Perry. The court referred the matter to the
Referee in Bankruptcy whose report resolving all issues of
fact and law was wholly adopted. The creditors alleged
93
Perry had committed the second, fifth and sixth acts

of

bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act. In an involuntary
bankruptcy proceeding, the creditors must "show by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor is subject to ad94
judication."
The second act of bankruptcy provides that the alleged
bankrupt must have "made or suffered a preferential transfer, as defined in subdivision (a) of section 96 of this title." 95
An essential element of a second act violation is proof of the
debtor's insolvency at the time of the transfer.90 All records,
documents and accounts indicated Perry's financial viability,
and consequently the prerequisite to the charge remained unsubstantiated. The alleged "preferential transfer" was in
fact a transaction by which Perry's bank removed $50,000.00
from his deposits and applied the sum to a note not yet due.
The referee observed authority 97 holding that the act of a
bank withdrawing funds and applying them against a debt
does not constitute a "preferential transfer" within the meaning of the Act.
To have committed the fifth act of bankruptcy, Perry
must have "while insolvent or unable to pay his debts as they
mature, procured, permitted, or suffered voluntarily or involuntarily the appointment of a receiver or trustee to take
charge of his property."93 The creditors eight days before
filing this action had -without Perry's knowledge obtained
on ex pcrte petition an order from the Court of Common
Pleas, Spartanburg County, placing Perry's property in receivership. Because Perry had not received notice, the referee
readily dismissed any suggestion of his having "procured"
or "permitted" receivership, leaving for consideration the
question of whether he had "suffered" receivership. The referee held that the word "implies knowledge of the thing
93. See 11 U.S.C. §§21(a)(1)-(6) (1970).
94. 336 F. Supp. at 423.

95. 11 U.S.C. §21(a)(2) (1970).
96. See 11 U.S.C. §96(a)(1) (1970).
97. Joseph F. Hughes & Co. v. Machen, 164 F.2d 983, 986 (4th Cir. 1947);
see Citizens' Nat'l Bank v. Lineberger, 45 F.2d 522, 527 (4th Cir. 1930).
98. 11 U.S.C. §21(a)(5) (1970).
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suffered or done; and a forfeiture for suffering a thing to be
done cannot be sustained without proof of knowledge." 99 Because Perry had promptly opposed and responded to the proceedings in both courts, the referee concluded that he had
not "suffered" receivership of his property and disallowed
the creditors' fifth act charge.
The sixth act of bankruptcy necessitates proof that the
alleged bankrupt "admitted in writing his inability to pay his
debts and his willingness to be adjudged a bankrupt."' 10 0 The
creditors based this charge on a letter mailed to Perry's creditors which summoned them to a meeting to discuss Perry's
inability to pay his debts. 10 A sixth act offense requires additionally a writing confessing the bankrupt's "willingness to
to be adjudged a bankrupt," and the referee held that the
creditors failed to submit proof of this element.
IX. AUTOMOBILES
The respondents in Jones v. Grissett'0 2 instituted their
suits to recover damages resulting from injuries received in
an intersection collision with the appellant Grissett. The respondents occupied an automobile which was the third of
twenty cars following a "family car" to the funeral home.
The appellant testified that he and the co-defendant had
entered the intersection after the signal facing them turned
green, while the respondent-driver explained that even though
she was in the intersection during the caution light she had
entered on a green light. The jury returned a verdict against
Grissett and he appealed.
The appellant contended the trial judge had erred by
refusing to grant his motion for a directed verdict and urged
the supreme court to review the evidence and to conclude that
it supported the motion. Finding discrepancies in the testimony at trial, the court rejected the appellant's contention
by relying on the well-settled rule that resolution of factual
disputes is a function of the jury. This ruling by the court
99. 336 F. Supp. at 426.
100. 11 U.S.C. §21(a) (6) (1970).
101. Perry's attorney signed this letter which generally confessed the existence of Perry's financial difficulties. The meeting the creditors were requested
to attend was only for informal discussions. See 336 F. Supp. at 427.

102. 258 S.C. 22, 186 S.E.2d 829 (1972).
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effectively disposed of the appellant's argument that the failure of the jury to render a verdict against his co-defendant
at trial acted also to relieve him of liability. The evidence
relevant to the co-defendant's role in the accident revealed
that she had been proceeding approximately parallel to Grissett before the defendants' automobiles struck the respondent's automobile. Finding the evidence as to the two not
"identical," the court believed it unnecessary to search for
similarities in the evidence and held that the jury had properly exercised its delegated power to decide disputed factual
issues.
Grissett also argued that the trial judge had erred in
refusing to grant his motion for a new trial. The basis for
the alleged error was the trial judge's failure to charge the
statute'0 3 respecting observance of traffic-control devices.
The court agreed with the appellant that since the collision
occurred at an intersection regulated- by traffic signal, the
statute should have been charged. The court also found itself
in accordance with the appellant's view that the trial judge
had erred in instructing the jury that if an "ordinary and
reasonably prudent driver"'1 4 in the defendant's position had
known or had reason to believe the cars passing were connected with a funeral "then common decency would require
a person to yield and not to break up or disturb something
of such a sacred nature . . . ."15 This conclusion dismissed
any notion that the statutorily prescribed standard of care
was subordinate to any general law of "common decency."
Finally, the court elected to dismiss any suggestion that
the twenty-car motorcade constituted a lawful "funeral procession." No statute or pertinent city ordinance defined
"funeral procession," and the court believed it unnecessary
to resort to a judicial definition of the term and found it
sufficient to simply deny that status to the motorcade in the
103. S.C.

CODE ANI.
§46-304 (1962) provides:
The driver of any vehicle shall obey the instructions of any
official traffic-control device applicable thereto placed in accordance with the provisions of this chapter unless otherwise
directed by a traffic or police officer, subject to the exceptions
granted the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle in this
chapter.

104. 258 S.C. at 26, 186 S.E2d at 830.
105. Id. at 26, 186 S.E.2d at 831.
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instant case. The factors mentioned in reaching this conclusion were the absence of a police escort, or hearse, the failure
of the drivers to burn their headlights, and the lack of an
authorized traffic permit.
The issue in Rabon v. South Carolina State Highway
Department'01 was whether the word "violation," as used in
the state statute 07 which provides for license suspensions of
intoxicated motor vehicle operators, referred to the actual
conviction of the offense or to the act of committing it, for
the purpose of determining "the date of last violation." The
statute reads in part as follows:
Only those violations which occurred within a period of ten years
including and immediately preceding the date of the last violation

shall constitute prior violations within the meaning of this section. 108

Respondent Rabon hoped to have his license suspended
for six months instead of twelve. The longer penalty is designed for offenders who have twice violated the drivingunder-the-influence law within a ten-year period. The facts
revealed that Rabon's second conviction occurred more than
ten years after the dates of the first chargeable act and conviction; however, the date of the second chargeable act was
within ten years of the date of the first chargeable act. The
trial court had ruled the word "violation" in the statutory
scheme meant "conviction" and reduced the suspension period
to six months. On defendant's appeal, the South Carolina
Supreme Court, following the "ordinary and popular"' 0 9
meaning test, defined "violation" as "the act of breaking,
infringing, or transgressing the law-in this instance, the
law prohibiting one from driving under the influence of
intoxicants, etc."" 0 Reversing the lower court decision, the
court held that the word "violation" within the statutory
context referred to the act of driving under the influence,
rather than the subsequent conviction, for purposes of determining "the date of last violation."

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

187 S.E.2d 652 (S.C. 1972).
S.C. CoDE ANN. §46-348 (1962).
Id.
187 S.E.2d at 654.
Id.
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PARTNERSHIP

Teague v. Workman' was an action to settle affairs
after the dissolution of a business partnership. The Articles
of Partnership provided upon termination for a division of
assets, one-fourth to Teague and three-fourths to Workman.
The defendant Workman appealed to the South Carolina
Supreme Court from the trial court's adaption of the report
of the Master in Equity.
The supreme court found that aside from failing to resolve disputed factual issues and to state the account between
the parties the tial court had granted Teague the option to
accept five items of property and pay Workman $350.00 or
to take one-fourth of the proceeds from a public sale of the
assets. The court objected to this arrangement, and its holding
may be ascertained from the following passage:
It was error plain on the record for the Master to fashion a division
of the partnership property (without any supportive findings) to be
implemented as a final settlement of partnership affairs, or not, at the
pleasure of one party. The alternative disposition ordered by the
court-the sale of assets and ratable division of the proceeds--cannot
be accomplished until an account between the parties has been stated,
which is the essence of this action to settle and wind up the affairs of
2
the partnership."1
XI.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

The plaintiffs in Lathem v. City of Greenville" 3 owned
land abutting Sagamore Lane in Greenville, South Carolina.
Two-thirds of the Sagamore Lane homeowners had earlier
petitioned the city under section 33-711- of the Greenville
City Code for the paving of the street, the cost of which was
111. 256 S.C. 535. 183 S.E.2d 340 (1971).
112. Id. at 538, 183 S.E.2d at 342.
113. 256 S.C. 586, 183 S.E2d 455 (1971).
114. This ordinance allows two-thirds of the property owners whose land
abuts the street to petition the city manager for improvements. Part of the
section states:
The City Manager shall then have (it) determined whether
(two-thirds) have signed, and, if so, he shall then have determined an estimate of the costs of the improvements. This information, with the petition, shall be presented by the City Manager
to the Council at its next regular or special meeting. The Council shall then consider the petition and the accompanying information and take such action thereon as it may deem advisable.
256 S.C. at 589, 183 S.E.2d 456-57.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

23

South
Carolina
Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [2020], [Vol.
Art. 10 24
SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAW REVIEW

to be shared by the property owners. Eighteen months after
the filing of the petition, the plaintiffs enjoined the city from
paving the street, on the grounds that the section 33-71 procedure for processing the petition had not been followed. The
defendants appealed from the injunction to the Supreme
Court of South Carolina.
The respondents alleged the following irregularities: (1)
that the petition was filed with the city engineer rather than
the city manager; (2) that the city manager failed to submit
the petition to city council; and (3) that the council meeting
which approved the petition took place two weeks after "its
next regular or special meeting"-each of which constituted
a variance with established procedure'1 5 in the city code. Respectively, the court responded to these claims with the following explanations: (1) the city manager could properly
delegate this duty to the city engineer; (2) the petition was
presented in the form of a general street proposal; and (3)
the slight delay was inconsequential in light of the purposes
for such an approval deadline.
In reversing the lower court, the supreme court relied
on the following principle for authority:
Nonobservance of mere directory provisions, slight irregularities,
immaterial variances, and minor departures from the letter of the
requirement which are not fundamental to the initiation and progress
of the improvement, or the levying, confirmation and validity of the
assessment, and which are not injurious or prejudicial to the landowners who are called upon to pay, will be disregarded, where there
is substantial compliance with requirements.' 1 6

XII.

COUNTIES

The Gantt Fire, Sewer and Police District in Greenville
County, South Carolina, during past years had accumulated
a sizable surplus in the accounts receiving the taxes collected
for the retirement of bonds and for general operating expenses. The amount of both taxes had been in the past solely
determined by the district. The plaintiff-taxpayer in Edg1 7 chalcomb Steel Co. v. Gantt Fire,Sewer & Police District"
115. Id.
116. Id. at 590, 183 S.E.2d at 457, quoting from 14 E. McQuiLiN, LAw
§38.175 (3d ed. rev. vol. 1970).
117. 257 S.C. 21, 183 S.E.2d 567 (1971).

OF MUNICIPAL CORPOATIONS
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lenged the tax and by mandamus sought "to require the commissioners to annually submit to the auditor of Greenville
County a budget or estimate of the district's financial needs
for the ensuing year, together with a statement of anticipated
receipts and any existing surplus, as the basis for a determination by the auditor of the amount of the tax levy to be
imposed." 118 The trial court agreed with the petitioner, and
the defendant appealed.
The main issue before the South Carolina Supreme Court
was whether the commissioners were required to submit an
annual report to the county auditor for his approval. The
plaintiff's argument relied on the general public works statute, 119 the provisions of which had previously been ruled'2 0
permissive rather than mandatory. That statute requires commissioners of the districts created under it to submit a budget
to the county supervisor for approval. The defendant-district,
however, had been created by special act,12 ' which failed to
require the commissioners to file a proposed budget with the
county. In light of the provisions in the special act, the court
ruled that the specific relief requested by the plaintiff must
be denied; however, the court sought to clarify for the benefit
of the commissioners their obligations to the district taxpayers under the act.
The act provided for the creation of a debt retirement
tax and an operating expense tax. The debt retirement tax
set forth in the act' 22 makes the auditor and treasurer of
Greenville County responsible for its levy and collection; however, the tax is subject to the following provision:
The annual ad valorem tax herein directed to be levied may be
reduced in each year by the amount of net revenues as aforesaid
actually in the hands of the Treasurer of Greenville County at the
time the tax for such year is required to be levied, and the tax may
be entirely suspended for any year in case such moneys on hand,
applicable as aforesaid, are sufficient to pay both principal and interest
123
then due or falling due in such year and remaining unpaid.

The court in view of this language concluded that any sur118. Id. at 23, 183 S.E2d at 567.
119. S.C. CODE ANN. §59-623 (1962).

120. Mills Mill v. Hawkins, 232 S.C. 515, 103 S.E.2d 14 (1957).
121. 48 S.C. STAT. AT LARGE 2215 (1954).
122. Id. §21(e), at 2223.
123 Id.
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plus in the debt retirement account should clearly be considered by the county in determining the amount of the tax.
The operating expense tax under the act 1 24 vested the district
commission with sole discretion in assigning the amount of
the tax; however, such funds were to be raised for "discharg-

ing the duties vested in

it.

' ' 125

Therefore, in summary, the supreme court held that the
commissioners were not required to submit a budget to county
authority for approval, "but that the duties and responsibilities of the officials involved with respect to the assessment
of taxes for the district are governed by the provisions of
the special act creating the district."'12

XIII. RIMvFa AND HARBORS
Mitchell v. Tenneco Chemicals, Inc.,127 was an action instituted in the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina by the plaintiff on behalf of himself and
for the use of the United States for alleged violations of the
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899.128 Pursuant
to the Act and other statutory provisions, 29 the plaintiff
sought a money judgment, styling his complaint as a qui tam
action which "is one brought by an informer under a statute
which establishes a penalty or forfeiture for the commission
or omission of some act, and which additionally provides for
the recovery of the same in a civil action with part of the
recovery to go to the person bringing the action."'130
The issue was whether the Act supported such an action,
and the court decided it did not. Section 411131 established
124. Id. §24, at 2225.
125. Id.
126. 257 S.C. at 28, 183 S.E.2d at 570.

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

331 F. Supp. 1031 (D.S.C. 1971).
33 U.S.C. §§401, 403, 404, 406-09, 411-14, 418 (1970).
28 U.S.C. §§1331, 1355, 2461 (1970).
331 F. Supp. at 1032.
33 U.S.C. §411 (1970) states:
Every person and every corporation that shall violate, or that
shall knowingly aid, abet, authorize, or instigate a violation of

the provisions of sections 407, 408, and 409 of this title shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding $2,500.00 nor less than $500.00,
or by imprisonment (in the case of a natural person) for not
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the fines for violations of the Act but also left private recovery of a portion of the fines to the discretion of the trial
court. A condition precedent to any possible private recovery
under section 411 is a conviction for violation of the Act, and
that requisite remained unsatisfied, the Act having been adjudged criminal in nature and enforceable only by the De18 2
partment of Justice.
TIMOTHY L. CLEVELAND

less than thirty days nor more than one year, or by both such
fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, one-half
of said fine to be paid to the person or persons giving information which shall lead to conviction.
132. 33 U.S.C. §413 (1970).
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